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CHAPTER 5
Direct Controls
IN ANALYZING the fiscal methods of 'buying' defense we em-
phasized the need of curtailing civilian purchase of non-
military goods, as well as of goods that compete directly with
military production. We now discuss, first, the inadequacies
of the price system in emergencies and of fiscal methods as
the sole means of achieving the double goal of an effective
diversion of resources to the war program and preventing in-
flation. Fiscal methods must be supplemented by direct com-
pulsion. Second, we analyze the main types and techniques
of direct control, observing the limitations on any system,
and the interrelations between their use and wartime finan-
cial policies. This chapter is not intended to be a treatise on
direct controls as such; it is confined rather to the implica-
tions of their use for governmental fiscal policies today.
1 WEAKNESSES OF THE PRICE SYSTEM IN EMERGENCIES
The efficacy of any fiscal policy that may be pursued by the
government depends in considerable degree upon the effec-
tive functioning of the price system. Even in ordinary times
we have found it desirable to supplement or modify the price
system in certain sectors of our economy, such as public utili-
ties, coal, oil, and agriculture. In wartime, such sectors are
multiplied. At the close of the first World War, the experi-
ence of every large participating country had convinced stu-
dents of the subject that earlier and more extensive direct
economic controls by government would be necessary in the
next war. The striking extent to which the British have gone
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in this direction in this war is evidence of an intensified con-
viction on this point.
What are some of the principal limitations upon the price
system as an instrument for the reallocation of productive
resources in a war? First, large military orders often create
artificial scarcities by inducing a rush of inventory accumula-
tion on the part of business enterprises and of hoarding by
individuals, thereby accentuating the real shortages which
arise from military buying or other causes. Even very high
bids by the government are not sufficient to obtain control
of supplies. In the long run, this condition might correct
itself, but wars are fought in the short run. Priorities and
rationing at consumer and other levels are means to combat
this difficulty.
Second, although price advances based upon accurate fore-
casts of demand and supply conditions may serve to curtail
non-military consumption to a certain extent, they Cannot
always be relied upon to do this with sufficient effectiveness.
The curtailment may take place too slowly. A varying part
oil the civilian demand for many goods of great military im-
portance is relatively unresponsive to advances in price. The
chromium, nickel, and cadmium used in alloy steels, for ex-
ample, are needed in such relatively small quantities for civil-
ian purposes that little reduction would occur in this use of
them even with sizable price rises, particularly in the short
run.
Third, the expansion in general civilian consumption stimu-
lated by rising employment and payrolls may compete suc-
cessfully with the military demand for various materials on
a price and profits basis. The growth of labor incomes may
cause such increases in consumer demand and in the profits
oil consumer goods industries as to lead the latter to attempt
both an increase in their output with existing facilities and
an expansion of their productive capacity, thereby adding
further to the competition with military demand for goods
arLd labor. On the other hand, unnecessary or unnecessarily104 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
sharp price advances in some lines, created by the temporary
artificial scarcities cited above, though subject to correction
in the long run, may cause needless curtailment of civilian
consumption.
Fourth, when rising and high prices do not constitute the
most effective stimulus for the provision of the needed sup-
plies, government may have to resort to outright compulsion.
This is clearly true in the case of personnel for the armed
forces: nearly all the major countries of the world have found
it more effective to draft men for the army and navy than to try
to attract them by high wages. Patriotism is a sharp spur for
business men and workers; but, although the profit motive
too is in general a similarly sharp spur, it may raise some seri-
ous obstacles through its bearing on certain business deci-
sions. Business men have a natural reluctance to risk losing
their regular markets by a temporary diversion of their facili-
ties to military purposes. Also they are afraid to expand their
plants to fill military orders because they dread the excess
capacity they will have on their hands when the war ends.
Even when the government is ready to provide the funds for
expansion, as is ours, this fear of the postwar effects of the
augmented plant capacity upon the industry's price structure
may retard needed expansion. Moreover, private enterprises
are naturally averse to making their designs, patents, proc-
esses, etc. available to potential competitors with idle produc-
tive capacity. But some duplications of plant and personnel
which are desirable under normal conditions to give the pub-
lic the benefits of effective competition and of flexibility in
the responses to its changing demands may constitute waste-
ful uses of scarce resources in wartime. The British govern-
ment is forcing numerous temporary consolidations of enter-
prises, particularly in the distributive trades, with the object
of releasing productive resources for the war industries.
Fifth, the effectiveness of high and rising prices as a stimu-
lus to output is sometimes lacking in the short run because
of physical limitations upon factory capacity, shipping facili-I)IRECT CONTROLS 105
ties, raw materials, or other needed factors. This has been the
5ituation since early 1941 for numerous drugs, most metals,
and nearly the whole machine tool industry. Free bidding
during an emergency can bring about wild and possibly con-
t.agious price increases, with consequent enlargement of gov-
ernmental costs, without eliciting enough additional supplies.
Such cases invite price fixing coupled with rationing.
Sixth, widespread dissatisfaction with the unmodified re-
5ults of the price system in the allocation of rewards and sac-
nfices is common during a national emergency. President
Roosevelt reflected a strong popular sentiment when he said
that nobody should be allowed to get rich out of the defense
program. When thousands of young men are being called
upon to interrupt their careers and to jeopardize their lives
by serving in the army or navy, it is a natural and nearly uni-
versal human reaction to resent the often whimsical effects of
wide price movements in enriching some classes and mdi-
viduals and forcing radical curtailment of consumption upon
others. When, as in Europe today, common necessities such
as food and clothing are in short supply, the gross inequali-
ties in their consumption that the price system, if uncon-
t,rolled, would bring about are likely to prove intolerable. In
England the rationing of foodstuffs and the taxing away by
the government of 8o per cent of all increases in business
profits above the prewar level, though undertaken for other
reasons as well, reflect these sentiments.
2 INDISCRIMINATE AND TARDY EFFECTS OF FISCAL CONTROLS
These deficiencies of the price system in a war are paralleled
by the limitations of fiscal measures as the sole instruments
of control, for such measures operate chiefly through prices.
1:n addition, fiscal measures are difficult to apply with a
$ufficient degree of precision and discrimination, and are
often exceedingly slow in their working. For example, the
consumption of specific goods, such as aluminum or steel,
may not be reduced when civilian spending in general isio6 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
reduced by heavy increases in income taxes or the extensive
application of sales taxes. Some taxpayers will get the money
to pay the extra taxes by reducing their consumption of goods
in abundant supply rather than by cutting down on durable
goods made of materials needed for armaments. On the other
hand, selective excises on automobiles, for instance, high
enough to ensure a substantial curtailment of total civilian
purchasing, would be hard on some people because they
would apply inflexibly to both necessitous and luxury de-
mand. One man's job may depend upon the purchase of an
automobile, whereas such a purchase may be a sheer luxury
to another. Worst of all, the latter is more likely to be able
to overcome the inhibiting influence of the tax. Furthermore,
even the ablest specialists do not know enough about the
responsiveness of the demand for different goods to changes
in their prices to fix specific excises with any hope of achiev-
ing precise reductions in their consumption.
So far as additional revenue is sought by raising the rates
or extending the coverage of the existing income tax with its
present method of collection, much of the corresponding
curtailment in private spending will be deferred until shortly
before or after the payments are actually due and some of it
as long as a year or more. Corporations commonly accumulate
funds as their tax liabilities accrue,, but most individuals do
so only in the year following, when the taxes are due. Even
when paid, the restrictive effects of increases in taxes may be
offset, as we have noted, because current liquid savings and
accumulated funds are used.
3 NEED FOR DIRECT CONTROLS
Considerations such as these indicate that much more prompt,
efficacious, and discriminating limitations on civilian spend-
ing may be accomplished by direct governmental prescrip-
tion—priorities, allocations, and rationing—than by purely
fiscal measures. Administrative decrees may be timed with
considerable precision, altered from time to time, and formu-DIRECT CONTROLS 107
lated discriminatingly to lead producers and dealers to con-
fine their sales of strategic goods to enterprises possessing
duly approved allocation or priority permits.
Direct controls may also be used to reduce greatly the
money costs of the war, and to lessen the dangers of inflation.
To the extent that the government conscripts soldiers at
$50 a month instead of bidding for them in the labor market,
and limits the prices it pays for steel, shells, chemicals, and
other goods to levels below those which would otherwise
prevail, the Treasury's need for funds is reduced. By fixing
maximum prices for a wide array of goods, the government
prevents speculative and contagious price increases in civilian
goods as well. Rationing can powerfully support price con-
trols by reducing effective demand for rationed goods.
Direct controls may be classified roughly into three broad
groups. The first includes all methods which apply direct
action to channel and stimulate the flow of materials into
military production and apply direct compulsion to restrict
cr prohibit the consumption of scarce materials for uses
deemed non-essential in the war. The chief methods, known
collectively as the priorities system, are priorities, allocations,
and rationing. The second broad group includes all devices
which operate directly upon the price mechanism, such as
fixing the prices of commodities and services, wage and inter-
est rates, rents, real estate, and capital values. The
third group includes restrictions on bank credit and the
flotation of new corporate securities, in order that non-
essential uses of credit and capital may be prevented from
competing with the war program.
The Priorities System
Merely placing orders for the enormous quantities of the
many and diverse products required for war will not ensure
their production promptly or in the necessary sequence. Not
only must civilian demands be prevented from delaying the
production of military goods and from using up essentialio8 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
materials, but the competition of the various military de-
mands with one another must be so handled as to prevent
the less important from holding back or disorganizing the
production of thee more important. Some orders must be
given precedence; manufacturers of military goods must be
enabled to obtain the materials and equipment they require;
and the production of some civilian goods and the use of
certain materials in products for civilian consumption must
be curtailed or even stopped.
One means of achieving these ends, first used during World
War I,is the priorities system. Although the allocation of
scarce materials, tools, and industrial equipment, and the pro-
hibition of certain uses of them, have become a part of that
system, it was originally devised as "a method by which one
body of officials would sit in judgment to determine the se-
quence in which materials should be manufactured and or-
ders filled".'
a) Preference Ratings
Both during World War I and in our recent defense program
the priorities system was at first confined to grading orders or
contracts by means of preference ratings (also called priority
ratings) which would indicate their relative importance or
urgency. These ratings were conceived of as serving two pur-
poses: on the one hand they were intended to aid producers
by requiring suppliers to give preferential treatment to or-
ders for such materials or equipment as were needed for the
execution of a contract with a rating; on the other hand they
were expected to help each producer plan his own produc-
tion by requiring him to execute his contracts in the order
•of their indicated urgency.
Preference ratings were at first assigned solely to war con-
tracts or orders that were either regarded as of special urgency
or with respect to which the producers applied for priority
aid in obtaining essential materials and supplies. Such aidDIRECT CONTROLS 109
was most commonly given in the form of an individual pref-
erence rating certificate issued to a manufacturer and consti-
tuting a notice to a specified supplier that the manufacturer's
order for specified materials was to be given preferential
t:reatment. When, however, a manufacturer is engaged wholly
or almost wholly in essential war work, a blanket rating gives
him the right to acquire specified materials quickly, without
getting a separate certificate for each order. Similarly, if sev-
eral manufacturers are all engaged in making the same kind
of product and are having difficulties in obtaining materials,
a blanket rating may be issued to all, and thereby the numer-
OUS individual certificates which would be required to cover
each contract and each supplier are obviated.
Preference ratings are usually applied to finished products,
such as tanks, airplanes, ships, guns, and, by successive exten-
sions to subcontractors and suppliers, reach down to the raw
materials in an effort to channel their flow through to the final
products.
b) Allocation of Materials
As the books of producers become crowded with war orders,
there is an increasing tendency to apply for priority aid; pref-
erence rating certificates assume unwieldy proportions and
create new problems. What has been termed the 'priority
scramble for raw materials' tends to develop, and the imme-
diately available supply proves insufficient to meet all de-
inands of equal priority. Some better system of controlling
and allocating supplies then becomes necessary, as it does
whenever shortages exist or seem imminent in any vital ma-
terial or equipment. Such a system is that known as industry-
wide mandatory priority control and allocation, by which
i.hegovernmentprevents the use of the controlled scarce
products in any manner not specifically authorized or directed
by the priorities administration. Instead of taking physical
possession of, and paying for, the entire output of the indus-110 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
try, then reselling it to various buyers, the government speci-
fies to whom and in what quantities the producer will be
permitted to sell it.
While preference ratings bring about some subordination
of civilian to military demands, non-defense industries are
more directly and specifically affected by industry-wide con-
trol and allocation of materials. Under it the quantities of
the controlled materials which may be used for non-military
purposes are definitely limited. Civilian needs may be allot-
ted specified amounts of a material in the order of their im-
portance; or the maximum quantity that may be used by a
particular industry or in the manufacture of a particular
product may be set; or use for non-military purposes may be
entirely forbidden.
An actual shortage of raw materials cannot, of course, be
made up for by allocation. But by wise allocation the most
effective use of the supply can be ensured, the 'priority scram-
ble' minimized, and better planning of the military program
as a whole and of the operations of individual manufacturers
achieved. Unlike preference ratings, which apply to finished
products and exert their influence downward through the
manufacturing process, allocations usually exert control over
the scarce materials and direct their flow upward to the final
product.
A priorities system, like other forms of direct control, in-
evitably leads to more and more stringent and extensive ac-
tion. As preference ratings become inadequate, the use of
materials and of industrial tools and equipment and their
allocation have to be specifically limited. And as war produc-
tion increases in volume and urgency, transportation facili-
ties, fuel, electric power, and even the labor supply must be
subjected to priority control in one form or another. The
next step is to stop the manufacture of customary products
by direct order or other forms of duress, as has already been
done with automobiles and numerous other products. Simi-
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be had to consumer rationing if gross inequities in the dis-
tribution of the supplies are to be avoided and inflationary
competitive bidding prevented. And to prevent stocks of
scarce goods from being exhausted before a rationing scheme
can be worked out and put into effect, it may be necessary to
impose a temporary ban on their sale, as was done with new
automobiles and tires.
The priorities system, as we see, is not a static plan which
is put into effect and never altered. On the contrary, it is a
system which unfolds and evolves steadily, in accordance with
the successive stages of an emergency. In the early phases of
the present emergency, such as the eighteen months prior to
Pearl Harbor, when the military demand for scarce resources
was not especially great in relation to supply, preference rat-
ings were the predominant and reasonably effective device
used to channel materials into military production in an or-
deny sequence. By early 1942 the situation had become radi-
cally different. It was clear that we must meet a substantial
proportion of the needs of the other twenty-six United Na-
tions as well as our own military and civilian requirements.
I)emand upon our resources became virtually unbounded,
but we had to keep it within the limits of our physical Ca-
pacity to produce. This balance is being achieved by a stead-
ily widening use of mandatory allocations under which our
supplies are apportioned among the competing demands
largely in accordance with strategic considerations.
Price Control
The priorities system not only dominates production of both
military and civilian goods; it also affects commodity prices.
By restricting and controlling the use of basic industrial raw
materials which are under industry-wide control and alloca-
tion, thereby limiting or preventing competitive bidding for
them, it assists in preventing their prices from rising. By cur-
tailing and even entirely shutting off the manufacture of
numerous consumer goods, however, it creates inflationary112 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
pressures which can be successfully combatted solely by a pro-
gram which includes an effective scheme of price control. In
the case of consumer goods in which acute shortages are
created, price control could probably not be made effective
unless accompanied by a system of rationing. For without
rationing there would still be competitive bidding of one
form or another for the scarce supplies, and bootlegging and
other forms of evasion of price control would appear. These
evasions are also possible under rationing, but in much less
degree. Because of the restrictive influence the production of
military products necessarily exercises upon the supply of
many consumer goods at the same time that consumers'
money incomes are being generally increased by the expen-
ditures associated with the war, general price control, supple-
mented and reinforced by fiscal measures designed to draw
off or immobilize excess consumer purchasing power, becomes
necessary if inflationary price rises are to be avoided.
In the present conflict, far more than in the preceding, the
significance of price control has been fully and widely appre-
ciated. All major belligerents have assigned price control a
principal role in their economic organizations. In most coun-
tries, these control systems were put in operation upon or
shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Some countries, espe-
cially those whose military efforts were furthest advanced in
September 1989,haveused price control as a means of more
perfect preparation for war as well as for its more effective
prosecution.
Price control has been recognized as a necessary supple-
ment to the priorities system,2 as helpful in promoting the
war and keeping down the money cost. But its chief value is
in preventing or at least retarding the price increases associ-
ated with the transition from a peace to a war economy. When
war comes, the established peacetime pattern of demand be-
comes obsolete; the demand element of the price structure is
violently and suddenly rearranged. The types, amounts, andDIRECT CONTROLS 113
proportions of goods desired by the people as a whole under
conditions are radically different from those wanted in
normal times. This change in the national will is reflected in
government spending. But government spending, in and of
itself, cannot supply the nation with its newly desired instru-
ments of war. A redirection of productive energies must fol-
low a redirection of national spending. Toward this end, the
configuration of the price structure begins to change. Prices
of wanted goods rise relatively to prices of unwanted. Forces
are unleashed which tend to remedy both short supply and
redundance. Time is too short for the price system to make
needed adjustments and too much is at stake. Price control
ca:ri prevent increases that are unnecessary or potentially
greater than necessary, thereby contributing the positive ad-
vantages already enumerated elsewhere. On the other hand,
it can permit an increase held desirable as an incentive to
production, or for any other reason. In short, it can retain
those aspects of the free price system which are useful in war-
time and at the same time remedy some of its defects.
It obviously has numerous advantages in war industries.
So far as price rises are prevented or minimized, the over-all
money cost of war is reduced. The government does not have
to collect so many dollars during the course of the war and
carries a smaller indebtedness into a postwar period of lower
price levels and money incomes. Price control helps also to
minimize business hoarding, manipulation, and speculation,
as well as civilian accumulation of essential materials.
So far as a stabilized cost of living is achieved, an important
source of pressure for wage increases is removed. A rise in the
cost of living is a frequent and persuasive argument for ad-
vancing wage rates. But if wage rates are progressively ad-
vanced, the consequent cost changes may, like some increases
in commodity costs, operate to discourage or diminish es-
sential production, and the consequent increase in money
income accentuates the fiscaltask of mopping up excess114 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
spending power. Moreover, a stabilized cost of living, by pre-
venting a decline in real wage and disputes based upon it,
removes at least one source of labor trouble.
a) Methods
Effective price control requires the regulation of prices and
of supply and demand. It is direct when it takes the form
of authoritatively established selling prices; it then becomes
synonymous with price fixing. When it is formal, official price
schedules are imposed upon the markets; when informal, rep-
resentatives of the industries concerned agree with price con-
trol officials upon prices to be charged and impose upon
themselves the enforcement procedure known as 'price disci-
pline'. Informal price fixing is widely used because, among
other reasons, the conference negotiations which are at its
heart afford an excellent opportunity to enlist the civilian
cooperation essential to successful wartime price control in
a democracy.
Price fixing ostensibly accomplishes the purpose of price
control but its effectiveness may often be more apparent than
real. Divergences between the real and the fixed price are
more likely when the fixed price is supported by indirect
price control. The disadvantages of price fixing, when used
alone, lie in enforcement. The fixed price is usually not the
same as, and is presumably below, the price which would be
established by a free market. Price control authorities must
be prepared to cope with the myriad devices of price evasion,
with bootleg or 'black' markets, and with all the potentiali-
ties inherent in the alteration of the commodity for which
the price is fixed as well as in the modification of the trade
practices that ordinarily surround it. When evasions threaten
to undermine respect for the law, the price control authority
can resort to price and commodity 'policing'. At best difficult
and expensive, especially in a democracy, it should be avoided
if possible.
Price fixing may be total or partial.3 Total price fixing usu-DIRECT CONTROLS 115
ally implies the selection of a general standard. Here, average
or maximum prices in effect at a given date or within a given
period become either the fixed prices or the bases for the de-
termination of fixed prices. Partial price fixing, on the other
hand, by its very nature calls for individual price standards,
in the choice of which judgment must be exercised. The ap-
propriate price is that just high enough to supply sufficient
incentive for production. Further, differential prices for dif-
ferent producers and for different units of supply, and 'price
parity' must also be considered.4
To supplement and support price fixing, or conceivably
even to take its place, prices may be indirectly controlled
through manipulation of the supply or demand factors, or
both, underlying the market. Manipulation of demand for
consumer goods includes all forms of moral suasion, restric-
tion of consumer credit, and rationing. These devices are
valuable supplements to wartime fiscal policy in that they
rapidly and certainly reduce civilian competition for mate-
rials and resources needed in the war program. They promote
the war effort by conserving resources and by facilitating
price control. By reducing consumer demand they relieve the
pressure set up in consumer goods markets by an abundance
of free purchasing power and divert that purchasing power
to idle balances, purchase of government bonds, or other uses.
Consumer rationing is of particular effectiveness in another
dhection: consistently and rigorously applied in all markets
where prices are under upward pressure because of an abun-
dance of purchasing power or of the repercussions of priority
and allocation systems upon underlying industries, it can re-
move many of the enforcement hazards inherent in price fix-
ing. If money alone cannot command goods, the temptations
to and the likelihood of price evasion will be appreciably
lessened.
Manipulation of supply includes the purchase and sale of
co;nrnodities by the price control agency or a governmen-
tal agency cooperating with it, requisitioning stores and in-ii6 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
ventories, payment of subsidies, encouragement of salvage,
stimulation of invention, search for new sources of supply,
encouragement of full capacity operation, conversion of plant
facilities, additions to plant and equipment, resort to imports,
and control of exports.
The goals of price control can be achieved through price
fixing or indirect measures, or through both. Price fixing by
itself, however, has certain serious disadvantages. Indirect
price control, on the other hand, while reasonably effective
in the early stages of a war program, cannot be expected to
meet later requirements fully unless supplemented by p1-ice
fixing.
b) Wage Control
Stability of wage rates is an enormously important factor in
the effectiveness of price control. The reasons are simple and
familiar. Continuously advancing wage rates will in time
raise costs and, consequently, bring pressure on prices and
cause them also to advance. While the cost of advancing wage
rates is in truth often absorbed by declining overhead costs
and increased efficiency, these factors cannot be counted
as permanent sources of savings, especially in the increasing
number of industries and plants that have attained capacity
output. A very large proportion of the working population
also is engaged in activities, notably the services and com-
merce, in which gains due to technological progress or in-
creased efficiency are limited or nonexistent and in which,
therefore, advancing wage rates are translated swiftly and al-
most proportionately into higher costs and prices. Whatever
effects an advance in wage rates may have on costs and
prices, it tends to swell labor income and, in time of shrink-
ing supplies of goods and services, acts as a positive force in
bidding up prices and, hence, in raising the general price
level. Since labor income accounts for more than 70 per cent
of national income and is anyhow expanding by reason of
fuller employment and overtime, there can be little doubtDIRECT CONTROLS 117
that pushing up wage rates still further augments this major
share of the national income and adds to the potency of this
inflationary force.
The reality of this simple sequence of events has been rec-
ognized in all warring countries. It accounts for the variety
of measures governments have taken to limit income and to
throw restrictions around its expenditure. Income has been
cut by resort to forced savings, by drastic income taxes, by
outright wage control, or by some combination of these meas-
ures.
In the United States wage rates started to go up at the
beginning of the war in 1939, and have advanced at an ac-
celerated rate since the beginning of 1941. During the first
half of 1942 they continued to rise and the leading trade
pressed for further increases. The combination of ad-
vancing wage rates and expanding employment has greatly
increased aggregate payrolls and labor income. With the cur-
reilt expansion of war production and the shrinkage of goods
available for civilian use, the continued rise of wages and
employment is bound to exert a cumulative upward effect on
prices and render difficult, if not impossible, effective price
control.
The threat of consequences of this sort has not passed
unnoticed. Many forms of regulation have been suggested,
ranging from substantial withholding taxes on wages to ceil-
ings on all wage rates. In the price control bill, approved
January 30, 1942, Congress refers to the problem by declaring
that "it shall be the policy of those departments and agencies
of the Government dealing with wages...,withinthe limits
of their authority and jurisdiction, to work toward a stabili-
zalion of prices, fair and equitable wages, and cost of pro-
duction".
Failure of Congress to go beyond this broad statement of
inl:ent has been due to a deep and persistent conflict between
price and wage policies. It has been assumed that the two are
independent and that prices can be controlled in the face ofii8 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
rapidly rising and unregulated wage rates. The first labor
board, the National Defense Mediation Board, failed to adopt
a general wage policy and may be said, in its adjudication of
specific cases, to have encouraged demands for higher wage
rates during 1941. Its successor, the National War Labor
Board, though apparently concerned over the inflationary
effects of rising wages, has been unable to impose effective
curbs on increases. If wage increases are to be restrained and
prices stabilized, the adoption uf principles to guide it in
dealing with current and future demands for wage increases
would seem to be one of the Board's most urgent duties. If
it is unable to reach an agreement on wage policy, the coun-
try must be prepared either to face a continuation of the wage
movements of 1941 or to look to Congress to give more spe-
cific instructions to the governmental labor agencies than it
has so far.
Control of Credit and the Capital Markets
In the credit and capital markets the free play of competitive
forces under ordinary competitive rules might succeed in di-
verting a large fraction of private savings to non-defense uses,
in unduly raising the interest costs of the government's emer-
gency borrowing, and in permitting a dangerous expansion
of bank credit.
A wartime policy of credit control must aim, therefore, to
prevent such diversion of savings, yet interfere as little as pos-
sible with borrowing operations and the free
flow of credit to industries engaged in military production.
In other words, non-essential credits must be restricted and
the extension of credit for essential purposes facilitated.
The principal types of credit with which we are concerned
in this section are commercial bank credit for ordinary pur-
poses, installment credit for the purchase of consumer dura-
ble goods, long term capital for new plant additions, work-
ing capital, home building, etc., and speculative credit for
the purchase of capital assets.tIRECT CONTROLS 119
Direct control of credit may be either quantitative or quali-
tative. Under ordinary peacetime conditions, quantitative
methods are usual. For example, the Federal Reserve Board,
in past years, has attempted to influence credit conditions
mainly by methods designed to increase or decrease the re-
serves available to member banks.
Although reasonably effective in times of peace, such quan-
titative methods alone suffer from serious defects during a
war. The general tendency of a reduction in excess reserves
to check an expansion of bank credit by raising interest
rates. This method of over-all credit limitation has the un-
fortunate effect of raising the interest cost of governmental
borrowing and increasing the difficulty the government has
insellingits bonds, owing to the depressing influence of ris-
ing interest rates on the market value of outstanding issues.
Furthermore, a general tightening of credit makes it more
difficult for private industry to get credit for military pro-
d.uction.
On the whole, the evidence seems to indicate that more
harm than good is likely to come from an extensive use of
quantitative credit controls in wartime. What is clearly called
for is a qualitative control of credit or a direct limitation of
particular credits deemed non-essential for the war program.
Fortunately, from the administrative standpoint, the prob-
1cm is not nearly so difficult as it might seem. So far as the
priori ties system is effective in curtailing the flow of materials
arid equipment to non-defense uses, credit is automatically
limited for these areas. The generalization may be made that
direct credit control will be necessary only in areas where
other methods of direct control do not reach or prove inade-
quate. In fact, direct control will usually be unnecessary for
all the types of credit listed above, except speculative credit
for the purchase of capital assets and installment credit for
the purchase of consumer goods.
For example, the Reserve Board, on September i, 1941,
imposed restrictions upon the extension of credit by banks120 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
and others for the purpose of financing any one of twenty
kinds of consumer durable goods. At the time, the priorities
system was just beginning to restrict the output of such items
as are largely competitive with military production. Credit
control in this area, therefore, seemed a useful device to check
both an undesirable expansion of credit and the production
of non-essential goods. Since then, however, production of
most of these items has been either curtailed severely or
stopped completely. Consequently, the occasion for regulat-
ing this type of credit has been greatly lessened.
During the first World War a Capital Issues Committee
was established in the United States to control the sale of
securities for the purpose of raising new capital. Under a
somewhat inadequate priorities system, it performed a useful
function in checking non-military capital outlays, particularly
in state and municipal bond issues for construction purposes.
In 1941 the Securities and Exchange Commission took a step
in this direction by requiring that all prospectuses filed with
it contain a statement indicating whether the proceeds were
to be used in ways serving national defense. More stringent
steps of this kind may be taken in the future, but there is
little evidence yet of any need for them. War Production
Board control over materials and equipment is now so com-
plete that very little construction or expansion is possible in
enterprises not related to the war.
Possibly some additional control may seem desirable to
regulate the raising of additional working capital by private
business. Under thepresent corporate tax structure, in which
interest is a deductible expense and high tax rates are applied
to corporate incomes, the cost of such additional capital is
almost negligible and the temptation to float such issues, even
if they are not needed for immediate business purposes, is
offered. Excess funds of this kind may constitute a potential
inflationary threat because they may be invested in capital
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cash balances or invested in government bonds, they cannot
hamper the war program.
Under these conditions, the need for control seems to lie
chiefly in the field of speculative credits extended to carry
'capital assets. As individuals accumulate savings because they
cannot use the customary consumption and investment out-
Lets, strong pressures arise for such funds to spill over into
the capital markets and into speculative real estate purchases.
Rising prices in these fields may stimulate the extension of
•bank credit for such purposes, create further inflationary pres-
sure, and make more difficult the sale of government bonds.
During the first World War this country permitted a boom
infarmreal estate, financed in considerable degree by bank
and mortgage credit. Inflationary forces during and immedi-
ately after the war were thereby accentuated. The disastrous
deflation which followed left a legacy of widespread bank-
ruptcy among farmers and banks for the next decade.
No such phenomenon has yet appeared in the United
States, probably because ordinary civilian spending has not
yet been curtailed sufficiently for large excess funds to accu-
:rnulate in the hands of the public. In totalitarian Germany,
on the other hand, the control of the stock markets has been
of the most difficult tasks with which Nazi officials have
to cope. Despite drastic taxation and forced government
Loans, savings have continued to accumulate rapidly and have
spilled over into the purchase of securities. German officials
have expressed considerable concern over the inflationary
implications of the advance of approximately 6o per cent in
Berlin stock market averages since autumn 1939 and have
tried various measures to check it, but without complete suc-
:ess. A similar though less striking phenomenon has appeared
[n England. Since the low point reached with the collapse of
France, the London stock market average has shown a mod-
but steadily rising trend; meanwhile stock market av-
in the United States have shown more weakness than
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Although this situation presents a problem which is broader
than mere credit control, regulation of speculative credit is
the first line of defense. The Federal Reserve Board already
possesses broad powers to limit the use of credit in security
markets, and both federal and state banking laws restrict the
extension of credit for carrying real estate. If inflationary
tendencies appear in either of or both these areas, more dras-
tic restrictions may prove desirable.
Even if the credit factor were eliminated, the danger of
stock market and real estate booms might still remain, be-
cause of the pressure exerted by rapidly accumulating cash
savings. Such developments do not directly divert resources
from the war effort, but they are inflationary and may have
detrimental indirect effects. The chief reason is that advanc-
ing capital markets create an illusion of prosperity in the
minds of the owners of capital assets and tend to heighten the
pressure for consumption expenditures.
The checking of such developments by direct control is
elusive and difficult, as is shown by the German experience.
Some degree of control over urban real estate values may be
achieved by establishing ceilings on rents, and over rural real
estate values by preventing an advance in agricultural com-
modity prices, but control of a stock market boom by com-
pulsion is not easy. On the whole, the best safeguard against
booms of this sort is a wise fiscal policy which will not only
mop up as much as possible of the excess purchasing power
in the hands of individuals by taxation and the sale of gov-
ernment bonds, but will also check inflationary tendencies in
the stock market by heavy taxation of corporate profits.
4 EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS OF DIRECT CONTROLS
Theoretically, under a perfect system of direct controls a
nation might wage a major war successfully and bother little
about its fiscal policies. If the priorities system could divert
all resources needed from civilian to military uses, if price
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wages, and rents, and if credit control could prevent specu-
]ative excesses in the capital markets, a country might con-
ceivably finance the cost of the war entirely through bank
credit or printing-press money.
Even under such hypothetical conditions, the difficulties
would be enormous. In the first place, tremendous inflation-
ary pressures would arise from the excess purchasing power
i.n the hands of individuals which would make administration
progressively harder. In the second place, the psychological
effects on the population would be very adverse because of
uncertainty concerning the future. Finally, the postwar leg-
acy of debt might easily prove unmanageable.
In the real world, of course, no such achievement would
be possible, even for a totalitarian nation like Germany.
'While we may concede that a major war, which involves the
diversion to military purposes of half the national product,
could not be waged successfully without an effective system
of direct controls, we must also realize that the limitations to
the effectiveness of any such system are definite.
The first is the difficulty of administration, which is almost
insuperable in any attempt to organize, in minute detail and
quickly, a population of 130 million. Another difficulty arises
from the progressively expanding necessity for direct controls.
:Direct controls imposed upon certain areas of production or
consumption intensify the inflationary pressures in the areas
•which remain uncontrolled, forcing the system to widen step
•by step until it encompasses almost every phase of human ac-
tivity. With each successive step administration becomes more
onerous, and the stresses and strains in the economic structure
increase.
The second limitation is political. While the populations
of most countries show an amazing willingness in wartime to
•bear sacrifices and to subordinate their individual interests
to the common welfare, certain areas usually exist in which
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no further than at the attempts to regulate agricultural prices
and to control wage rates in the United States today.
Finally, certain areas, e.g., capital assets, are extremely dif-
ficult to reach by methods of direct control. Large amounts
of excess purchasing power that are not absorbed by taxation
or directed into the purchase of government bonds will inevi-
tably spill over into the capital markets, unless transactions
in the latter are virtually prohibited.
Credit control as such cannot be expected to prevent a
general inflation in wartime. Even if the priorities system is
entirely adequate, and is supplemented by direct control of
credit wherever necessary, general inflation may still occur if
taxation and borrowing policies are unwise.
5 INTERRELATION OF DIRECT CONTROLS AND FISCAL POLICIES
The principal conclusion is that no system of direct controls
can function effectively in the absence of adequate taxation
and sound borrowing policies. Direct controls and fiscal poli-
cies are mutually complementary, and a judicious combina-
tion of the two is essential for the successful prosecution of
a major war.
Adequate fiscal policies, on the one hand, make a system
of direct controls more effective by reducing the inflationary
pressure of excess spending power and by checking civilian
competition for essential resources. An efficient system of
direct controls, on the other hand, has important influences
on fiscal policy:
i) By restricting investment opportunities in most of the
usual areas, it facilitates the government's task of chan-
neling private savings into the purchase of government
bonds.
2)It makes possible government borrowing from sources
such as commercial banks, which, in the absence of direct
controls, would be highly inflationary, but which, with
such a system in operation, may not be.
3) With effective direct controls it may be possible, and en-ONTROLS 125
proper, for a government to raise a smaller propor-
F its total financial needs from taxes and a larger
rtion from loans.
n taxation policies, which would be desirable if di-
)fltrOls were inadequate or ineffective, tend to be-
unnecessary, even harmful, when a system of direct
)ls operates efficiently. An example, discussed in de-
i Chapter g, can be seen in the proposal to impose
excises on articles, such as consumer durable goods,
roduction of which is directly competitive with the
)rogram.
NOTES
1BernardM. Baruch, American Industry in the War (Prentice-Hall, i941),
P.47.
2"Thepriorities system cannot work alone. Itis the heart of industrial
mobilization, but it needs the other organs. Above all,it must have the
assistance of price control, conservation, the search for substitutes and corn-
mandeerin g.
Price control is necessary because the priorities system is actually a means
of short circuiting the laws of supply and demand. Scarce commodities, in-
stead of being distributed to those who can pay the highest price as under
a free economy, are allocated to those needs that are most important to the
armament effort as a whole. Such a violation of natural laws makes it ab-
solutely necessary to supplement the priorities system with some control of
prices." Bernard M. Baruch, Priorities: The Synchronizing Force, Harvard
Business Review, Spring 1941,p.267.
3Totalor over-all price fixing envisages control of all prices, while partial
or selective price fixing requires the exercise of governmental authority only
in the case of "unruly' or 'key' prices. The interrelation of all prices makes
any system of selective price control exceedingly difficult to administer effec-
tively. Since the prices of other goods and services are affected by the control
of some, the former are in fact 'controlled' but controlled remotely, ineffec-
tively, and irrationally. Selective price control amounts therefore to rational
control over some prices and irrational control over others. The more effec-
tive the price fixing is the more probable become these undesirable results.
Unutilized purchasing power is diverted to the uncontrolled markets where
prices rise more than they otherwise would. Inflation is thereby stimulated
and relative prices are distorted more than they would be in consequence of
war production alone. Moreover, if any of the uncontrolled prices are cost
elements of the commodities for which the prices are fixed, price advances
may compel a revision of the fixed prices themselves.126 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
The strongest arguments against total price fixing rest upon the admin-
istrative difficultiesit would involve. To control all prices, to police all
prices, commodities, and services would require for a large country an enor-
mous administrative staff, an unbelievable number of administrative deci-
sions, and a range of administrative activity approaching total control of the
economic system. The spectre of such problems has been decisive for most of
those who have supported selective price control. Nevertheless, control sys-
tems that begin with a few prices may be forced to add so many that the
distinction between total and partial price fixing tends to disappear, as it
has in the adoption by the OPA of a 'ceiling' on prices in general and with
few exceptions.
To base minimum fixed prices of certain agricultural commodities on parity
prices injects into the price control program an element of variability beyond
the reach of the price administration. Parity prices are determined outside
the price control agency, are themselves dependent upon other prices, and
at the same time exercise significant influence over other prices, many of
which enter into the cost of living. An upward price spiral might be started
which could, under certain circumstances, menace a large part of the price
control program. Whether these circumstances will appear depends in large
degree upon the effectiveness of control over non-agricultural prices and
upon the demand.supply relationships that determine actual agricultural
market prices as opposed to agricultural parity prices.